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. I N T R O D U C T I O N
The Kyoto Protocol stipulates that industrialised countries and countries with economies in transition -the group of so-called Annex I countries -shall reduce their overall emissions of carbon dioxide and other five greenhouse gases (GHG) by at least 5 % as compared to their 1990 emission levels. In order to meet these targets costeffectively, the Kyoto Protocol allows the use of the market-based Kyoto Mechanisms at an international level. Essentially, the Kyoto Mechanisms enable Annex I countries and respective GHG emitting companies to meet part of their reduction commitments by financing GHG emission 1 A general overview of the Kyoto Protocol is Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999) . reductions abroad, where reduction cost might be lower. What strikes at first glance is that the Kyoto Protocol provides for two forms of international mitigation activities among Annex I countries, i.e. JI and IET. In order to respond efficiently and effectively to the Kyoto challenges, companies intending to operate in the emerging global market for GHG reductions need to know how different international transactions relate to the three Kyoto Mechanisms. 
. K Y O T O M E C H A N I S M S I N T H E K Y O T O P R O T O C O L
The Kyoto Mechanisms encompass JI, CDM and IET.
JI is described by Article 6 in conjunction with Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article 3. An important question is how these wordings could be interpreted from economic perspectives. To put the discussion in a more comprehensive perspective, the next section summarises perceptions on (the precursors of) the Kyoto Mechanisms which prevailed in the pre-Kyoto regime.
. P R E -K Y O T O J O I N T I M P L E M E N T A T I O N A S A F I R S T S T E P T O W A R D S I N T E R N A T I O N A L E M I S S I O N S T R A D I N G
Prior to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, there has been some experience with Before coining the concepts of JI or AIJ, international forms of GHG abatement had still another name, i.e. (external) offsets. The idea of (external) offsets is that "a given actor (which could be a firm, industry, region or country) has an initial target, but is allowed to offset this by investing in measures to reduce emissions by an equivalent amount elsewhere".
9
One main distinction and disadvantage of a tradable permit system as compared to (external) offsets is that the former involves defining an overall target for emissions for all participants, whereas offsets merely require the buyer to have a target.
10
Offsets may be regarded as precursors of JI, whereas the name JI evolved into AIJ. Common to all three pre-Kyoto concepts is that they had frequently been portrayed as a fist step towards an international regime of tradable GHG permits:
11 JI "serves the very important purpose of launching the process and providing opportunities for the various supporting administrative institutions to learn by doing as they mature in their assigned roles".
12
A "full-blown international market [for GHG emission permits] will have to develop gradually over a period of time as an evolutionary process, starting with offsets".
13
Offsets "could act as a natural stepping stone towards more comprehensive forms of international control, notably a system of tradable emission entitlements".
14 Against these views prevailing in the pre-Kyoto phase, it is rather confusing that the post-Kyoto phase is characterised by the co-existence of JI and IET, at least as far as the formal provisions of the Kyoto Protocol are concerned. Hence the important question arises, if JI in the Kyoto Protocol is a redundant instrument whose practical relevance will disappear as IET develops and becomes operational? Or are there any important economic and institutional reasons for a permanent and long-term factual co-existence of both instruments? In order to shed some light on these questions, the next section will explore possible distinctions between JI and IET.
8 On AIJ, see e.g. Schwarze (2000) . 9 See Grubb (1992) , p. 18. In contrast to external offsets, internal offsets are carried out within the territory of participating countries, but are not formally part of the main controlled emissions [Grubb (1992), p. 18] . In this distinction, JI would resemble external offsets. 10 Roland (1992) . 11 Such a perception is expressed e.g. by Bohm (1994a) and (1994b), Collamer and Rose (1998) , Grubb (1992) , Rentz (1996) , Roland (1992) , Tietenberg (1994) , Tietenberg and Victor (1994) . 12 Tietenberg and Victor (1994) , pp. 9-10. 13 Roland (1992) , p. 23. Text in brackets added by the author. 14 Grubb (1992) , p. 19.
. D I S T I N G U I S H I N G B E T W E E N J I A N D I E T I N T H E P O S T -K Y O T O R E G I M E
This section examines possible distinctions between JI and IET. In the relevant literature, three main criteria have been advanced: ♦ Private sector versus government participation.
♦ Baseline-and-credit versus cap-and-trade system.
♦
International production versus international trade.
. 1 J I v e r s u s I E T : P r i v a t e S e c t o r v e r s u s G o v e r n m e n t P a r t i c i p a t i o n
Sometimes it is argued that IET only allows international emissions trading among governments. If private entities, i.e. GHG emitting companies, wish to trade GHG reductions internationally, they would need to use JI.
15
According to this view, the main criterion for distinguishing IET and JI refers to participants: Regarding IET, only governments are allowed to participate, whereas JI is also available for private entities.
This perceptions originate from the language of the respective Articles of the Kyoto Protocol: Article 6.3 on JI explicitly states that "a Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate … in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this Article of emission reduction units".
16
Article 17, which refers to IET, does not mention explicitly any private-sector involvement. Instead, it only states that "Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading …".
Several arguments might be advanced against the perception that Article 17 only enables government-to-government trading: First of all, it is rather unusual that international public law, as is the Kyoto Protocol, explicitly refer to private-sector entities.
Hence, the language of Article 6, referring to legal entities, is rather unusual or abnormal.
The non-reference to private entities of Article 17 is instead the normal case in 15 Jepma (1998 Concluding, it does not appear to be appropriate to distinguish between JI and IET by a criterion of allowed participation.
. 2 J I v e r s u s I E T : B a s e l i n e -a n d -C r e d i t T r a d i n g v e r s u s C a pa n d -P e r m i t T r a d i n g
Generally, in the literature on emissions trading systems, a distinction is drawn between cap-and-trade systems and baseline-and-credits systems.
18
In both schemes, the generic term for the unit of trade is an emissions permit.
19
A cap-and-trade system starts by defining an aggregate, legally binding emission limit for a group of polluters, i.e. countries or companies, for a given period (see figure 2).
This limit is the cap. The emissions authorised by this cap are then allocated to eligible participants of the trading system.
20
In a cap-and-trade system, the allowed emissions are termed emission allowances.
21
In principle, all allowances can be traded. The most prominent example of a successful cap-and-trade system is the US SO2 trading system.
22
Under a baseline-and-credit system, the reference scenario for determining the amount of tradable emission permits is a baseline. Baselines need to be determined for each individual project, since a baseline-and-credit system is not comprehensive by its nature. As caps, the baseline could be an absolute level of emissions, which is fixed, decreasing or increasing over time. However, baselines may also be emission limits where the total emission level is not completely fixed, nor legally binding. For example, the baseline could be CO2 per capita, CO2 per GDP, or some future projection of emissions. Any emission reductions below this baseline are referred to as emission credits (see figure   3 ).
24
Only those emission credits can be traded. The emissions baseline in a credit scheme can be identical to the emissions cap in an allowance scheme. However, the two schemes have different implications regarding the 24 Sorrell and Skea (1999) .
timing and extent of regulatory involvement: Cap-and-trade schemes, which are comprehensive by their nature, require an extensive regulatory involvement and hence effort at the beginning to set it up. In contrast, credit schemes require less initial design and inception effort, but baselines need to be determined on an individual basis and individual trades must be certified by the regulator.
25
A credit system depends on a project-by-project analysis, whereas an allowance system depends on an inventory analysis of the regulated entities.
26
The main features of cap-and-trade versus baseline-and-credit systems are summarised in table 2: Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, and there is considerable dispute about which system is more efficient and hence more desirable.
27
What is more important in the present context is how JI and IET relate to these two systems. Indeed, some authors argue that IET constitute a form of an international cap-andtrade system, while JI can be regarded as international baseline-and-credit trading.
28
Analysing the wording of Article 6 on JI, such an interpretation suggests itself:
Article 6.1(b) states "any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would otherwise occur".
29
In this wording, the emissions that would otherwise occur may be regarded as baseline emissions (see figure 2 ). In the post-Kyoto discussion, the question of how to determine additional emission reductions generated by JI projects has been termed additionality issue which encompasses the baseline issue.
Several approaches for baseline determination of JI projects are presently discussed in the political and academic debate. Regarding IET as cap-and-trade system and JI as baseline-and-credit system, the following questions arise: Does the Kyoto Protocol provide for two competing instruments and leaves it up to the future to prove the superiority of one system or the other? Which system will be more successful and generally accepted? May we expect a corner solution in the sense that IET will replace JI?
At present, the parallel implementation of both systems, cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit, is being considered in some countries, e.g. in the United Kingdom. In reaction to it, several industry groups have negotiated a rebate on the levy in exchange for energy efficiency improvements. In many cases these targets are expressed as cuts in energy per unit of output rather than absolute reductions in energy. Consequently, these negotiated agreements imply only relative CO2 emission reduction targets, whereas participants in the absolute sector commit to absolute CO2 emission reduction targets. Firms in the unit sector would not receive permits directly but would have the right to trade permits subject to certain limitations. Purchased permits could be used by these firms to assist them in meeting their targets.
♦ Participants in the project sector: GHG saving projects would be allowed to generate credits which could be used to meet targets or which could be sold into the market.
Participants in the unit sector would be allowed to purchase permits from participants in the absolute or project sector. To ensure that output growth in the unit sector does not prevent the UK as a whole from achieving real emission reductions, a gateway mechanism would restrict net permit sales from the unit sector to the absolute sector.
International trades under the Kyoto Mechanisms would be recognised in the scheme once the governing rules had been agreed.
Trading within the absolute sector clearly shows features of a cap-and-trade system. Trading within the unit sector would constitute baseline-and-credit trading, whereby negotiated agreements with relative targets are the baseline. Hence, this proposed 31 The following description is based on Emissions Trading Group (1999) . See also Cooper (1999) .
UK trading scheme tries to implement a cap-and-trade system alongside a baseline-andcredit scheme. On the basis of the criteria advanced in this section, international sales out of the unit or project sector would qualify as JI, whereas international sales out of the absolute sector would constitute IET.
Coming back to the questions raised before, one could argue that the UK experiment will show if both JI and IET can co-exist in the longer term. Indeed, conventional wisdom and economic analysis suggest that the more efficient trading institution will replace the less efficient institution which involves higher transaction costs.
32
That does not imply, however, that we will globally obtain a corner solution in the sense that IET will completely replace JI, et vice versa. It is conceivable that for certain countries JI is the more efficient trading institution whereas for other countries transactions under IET are more efficient. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the countries in transition do not have the (financial) resources required to set up a comprehensive cap-and-trade system.
33
Hence, it could be more efficient for them to participate in international emissions trading under JI. Other countries which value the costs associated with settingup a comprehensive cap-and-trade system differently could find it more desirable to opt for this trading institution.
Moreover, one has to distinguish between different GHG and different sources. It could be true that IET is more efficient in the context of CO2 emissions from the power sector. Regarding other GHG and sources, like methane emissions from agriculture or CO2
emissions from industrial processes, transactions under JI might be associated with less transaction costs.
34
Concluding, JI might be interpreted as baseline-and-credit trading system, whereas IET could be regarded as representing a cap-and-trade system. If one accepts this distinction, it is interesting to ask which trading institution will be more efficient, thus replacing the less efficient one. Generally, it might be expected that JI will be more viable for certain countries, GHG and sources, whereas IET is more attractive for other countries, GHG and sources.
32 Considerations of institutional economics indicate that institutions like trading rules change over time in order to facilitate market development and reduce transaction costs. For an early discussion of this argument see Davis and North (1971) . 33 See e.g. Jepma (1999) .
. 3 J I v e r s u s I E T : I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n v e s t m e n t s v e r s u s I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e
It is frequently argued that JI involve international (equity) investments: Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack, e.g., states that "JI enables emission savings … arising from crossborder investments between Annex I parties to be transferred between them". another producer. Both activities, in-house production and purchase from another producer, could be performed domestically or internationally. Consequently, the company has four basic options. The choice between them represent a classical make-or-buy decision and will rest on the comparative costs of the four alternatives which comprise production and transaction costs. Feess and Stocker (1998) advance this general argument. 35 Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999) , p. 131. Italics added by the author. 36 Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999), p. 195 . Italics added by the author. See also Bayer and Cansier (1999) , p. 264, Dutschke and Michaelowa (1998), p. 8, Jepma (1999) or Missfeldt (1998) involved in carrying out transactions, and these transaction costs differ depending on both the nature of the transaction and on the way that it is organised. Moreover, the efficiency principle suggests that the tendency is to adopt the organisational structure that is associated with minimum transaction costs. Thus, transactions tend to occur in the market when doing so is most efficient, and they are carried out within some more formal organisation when doing so minimises transaction costs.
This general idea has been adopted in international economics to explain internationalisation of production as compared to international product trade through markets. According to the internalisation approach a company will internalise international market transactions through international production if this organisational form involves lower transaction costs.
38
Generally, the various dimensions of transactions will determine their organisational structure, i.e. hierarchies versus markets. In this context, it is useful to distinguish the following dimensions: Generally it may be expected, that the lower the degree of these transaction dimensions are, the more efficient are transactions mediated through markets. On the contrary, the higher the degree of these transaction dimensions, the more efficient are transactions co-ordinated internally. In the present context this implies, e.g., that the higher the specificity of GHG abatements are, the higher is the probability that related international transactions are performed through international production, i.e. JI, as opposed to international inter-firm trade, i.e. IET.
40
Against this background, it is a promising research area to analyse if GHG emission reductions of different abatement project types will be rather just purchased through IET or produced internationally via JI. In other words, will international transactions of GHG emission reductions resulting from different abatement project types be carried out internally on the basis of international production, i.e. JI, or through external markets, i.e. IET.
Related to this research topic, it might also be very interesting to explore the probable degree of internal co-ordination.
41
Besides foreign direct investments a company could choose other, less hierarchical forms of internal co-ordination. These so-called new forms of investment include sub-contracting, licensing, consulting and know how contracts, production sharing contracts, management contracts, contractual joint ventures and equity joint ventures.
42
In conclusion, it could be plausible to interpret JI as a form of international production of emission permits associated with subsequent internal international transfer, as opposed to pure international trade in emission permits through markets which would constitute IET. 40 For a comprehensive discussion of transaction costs associated with JI see Dudek and Wiener (1996) . 41 Rentz (1995) provides some preliminary discussion in this regard. 42 See e.g. Hennart (1989) .
. C D M : I N T E R N A T I O N A L I N V E S T M E N T S V E R S U S I N T E R N A T I O N A L C R E D I T T R A D I N G
After having discussed some possible distinctions between JI and IET, it suggests itself to ask how the previous discussion relates to CDM, another of the three Kyoto
Mechanisms. As argued before, there are two main criteria on the basis of which one could distinguish JI and IET: International credit versus international allowance trading and international production versus international trade of emission permits. Applying these criteria to CDM, it is interesting to explore if CDM constitute international credit trading, international allowance trading, or international production of emission permits?
Analysing the wording of Article 12 on CDM, it appears more appropriate to interpret CDM as a form of credits trading as opposed to allowance trading: Article 12.5(c)
require that "reductions in emissions … are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity".
43
In this wording, the emissions that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity may be regarded as baseline emissions (see figure 3 ).
Concerning the criteria international production versus international trade, it is frequently said that CDM projects involve international investments, thus constituting international production of emission permits.
44
On the other hand, it is also argued that CDM projects formally would not necessarily require any foreign investments. Instead, "a host country could already finance projects on its own and sell credits earned. Article 12
would not prevent this". 
46
Under the unilateral model "the developing country would … itself be acting as the main project investor and would attain the benefits as well as absorb the associated project risks".
47
In such a unilateral model there would be no foreign equity capital involvement as opposed to the bilateral model which is characterised by international investments by entities from Annex I countries. The unilateral model 43 Italics added by the author. 44 See e.g. Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999), p. 195, or Hahn and Stavins (1999) , p. 5. 45 Tietenberg et al. (1999) , p. 49. 46 Stewart et al. (1999) . 47 Stewart et al. (1999), p. 28. approach has already been applied in Costa Rica that has sold some emission credits generated through forestry projects financed without foreign equity capital investments. One could advance the counter-argument that Article 17 covers international allowance trading among private entities in Annex B countries.
50
Consequently, the unilateral model would be interpreted as international credit trading between non-Annex I and Annex I countries, which would be exclusively governed by Article 12.
On the international political agenda, this issue has attracted some attention in recent month. And future negotiations need to determine if Article 12 on the CDM allows application of the unilateral model, or if CDM requires involvement of equity capital from Annex I countries.
. O U T L O O K : W H I C H T Y P E O F K Y O T O M E C H A N I S M F O R I N T E R N A T I O N A L T R A N S A C T I O N S I N G H G E M I S S I O N R E D U C T I O N S ?
Convincing distinctions between the Kyoto Mechanisms JI, CDM and IET may be drawn on basis of the criteria cap-and-trade versus baseline-and-credit systems and international trade versus international production involving international investments.
Applying the first set of criteria, it seems that JI and CDM would represent some form of baseline-and-credit system. In addition, they could involve international investments. However, it is not clear if JI and CDM projects necessarily involve international investments, or if international investments in abatement projects would necessarily be carried out under the JI or CDM framework. Since international transactions of GHG reductions in a baseline-and-credit system seem to be governed by JI and CDM, it follows that Article 17 on IET would only apply to international transactions in a cap-andtrade system. Otherwise, either Article 6 on JI or Article 17 on IET would be redundant due to institutional arbitrage by market participants.
Concluding, international transactions related to abatement activities could be classified on the basis of the following different criteria:
1) Transferring entity is from (A) Annex I country or (B) non-Annex I country.
2) Acquiring entity is from (A) Annex I country or (B) non-Annex I country.
3) Transferring entity has (A) a baseline or (B) a cap.
4)
Production of emission permits involves (A) no international investments or (B) international investments.
5)
Acquiring entity uses the emission permits for (A) compliance with domestic regulations or (B) sale on international markets, whereby it has (BI) a cap or (BII) no cap.
As is shown by table 4, one could identify 48 different types of international transactions on the basis of these criteria. 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48) ?
In table 3 it has been tried to assign the different transaction types to the three Kyoto Mechanisms. It should be noted, however, that so far these questions have rarely been discussed and explored in a systematic way. However, in order to design regulatory frameworks for JI, CDM and IET efficiently, policy makers need to have an idea of the nature of underlying transactions. The same is true for economic research on the Kyoto Mechanisms: In order to analyse, e.g. the implications of JI, CDM and IET for technology innovation and diffusion, one would obviously need to have a clear understanding about the economic characteristics of these concepts.
